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Conflict of Interests in Biomedical Research:
Beyond Disclosure
Mark G. Kuczewski, Ph.D.*
Imagine that you are a member of a committee at your institution whose
job is to oversee conflicts of interest in biomedical research. While this is
sometimes done by the Institutional Review Board (IRB), many institutions,
including yours, began separate conflict of interest committees within the
last decade. Your committee has some fairly standard procedures regarding
your operations and how you judge the activities of investigators who report
income that requires oversight by your group. A typical situation that your
group reviews might involve an investigator who is conducting research
sponsored by a private pharmaceutical or device company. The
investigator's research could be any of a variety of types, from participating
in a clinical trial of a new medication to testing a new device that is
surgically implanted. Furthermore, this research can be at various phases of
development from a pilot study to determine the initial safety of a device or
medication to a later phase study in which the efficacy and market
worthiness of the research intervention is being determined.
You review the information that that the investigator submitted to your
committee and it shows that he has had a long-term relationship with this
sponsor that is known to you to have been fruitful in terms of funding and
publication. You note that in the past year he did a fair amount of
"consulting" work for this company and also has done some lecturing on
their behalf. He has done this kind of work for the company before and the
amount of money he receives in compensation varies from year to year but
is typically slightly less than the annual threshold your institution uses to
prohibit investigators from conducting research sponsored by that company,
perhaps $20,000 or so. After a brief discussion of your committee, a motion
is put forward to require that the investigator disclose this relationship to
potential enrollees in the consent form. The motion carries. Having now
received approval of the conflict-of-interest committee, his application is
sent on to the Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the next step in the
approval process for all research involving human subjects.

* Director, Neiswanger Institute for Bioethics and Health Policy, Father Michael I. English,
S.J., Professor in Medical Ethics, Loyola University Chicago Stritch School of Medicine.
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I. WHAT'S THE PROBLEM?

There are many possible reasons for concern in this scenario, and a
rapidly growing body of significant literature on conflicts of interest in
biomedical research is developing. This literature is beginning to illuminate
the many concerns we may have about these conflicts and the various
motives in requiring these disclosures. For instance, we may wish to simply
promote trust among the potential research participants by not withholding
such information. Or, we may think that the financial relationships could
potentially pose a risk to the subjects and that they should receive this
information in order to appropriately protect themselves. Or, perhaps more
despondently, we may think that it is all that we can do. I will focus on the
latter. In particular, I believe that there is an increasing recognition that
these gratuities compromise the integrity and professionalism of the
medical and research professions and that we cannot ameliorate simply by
informing potential research subjects.'
With the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act (1980), a great deal of money
from private industry has flowed into academic medicine, especially in the
form of sponsored research. But, beyond simply sponsoring research
studies, a significant amount of money flows to researchers in the form of
consulting and speakers fees, fees for recruitment of subjects to research
studies, and through equity interests of various kinds such as stock in the
sponsoring company or patent royalties. In general, universities have
focused their conflict of interest management strategies in areas that
generate, or have the potential to generate, very large sums of money.
Institutions have typically asked researchers to report income and revenue
from a corporate entity once it exceeded a certain annual amount, e.g.,
$10,000. In general, the assumption behind such thresholds for reporting
has been that the amount of monetary gain would have to be quite large
relative to a physician's salary to pose any real risk to the integrity of the
science or the human subjects involved. When large equity interests or
patents are at stake, conflict of interest committees or IRBs often add
protections such as appointing individuals or boards to monitor the data in
order to safeguard the integrity of the science.
Recent years have seen more attention paid to the lower end of the
monetary scale. Many esteemed groups that have put forward
recommendations suggesting that all relationships with research sponsors
be annually reported to the researcher's institution regardless of the amount
of money involved.2 This is, to some extent, an acknowledgement that
1. Kevin P. Weinfurt, Mark A. Hall, Nancy M.P. King, Joelle Y. Friedman, Kevin A.
Schulman & Jeremy Sugarman, Disclosure of FinancialRelationships to Participants in
ClinicalResearch, 361 NEw ENG. J. MED. 916, 916-21 (2009).
2. AAMC-AAU Advisory Committee on Financial Conflicts of Interest in Human
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relationships that have no currently determinable monetary value, such as
an equity interest in a start-up company with no current assets, can be of
great value once a biomedical product is produced and patented. But, it is
also evidence of a growing awareness that relationships that involve
relatively small amounts of money can pose risks to patients and human
subjects.
This recognition of the potential corrosive effects of small gifts has a
recent parallel on the treatment side of health care. In the last decade, many
health care institutions have adopted a variety of measures to restrict the
activities of representatives of pharmaceutical companies within their
institutions. In many hospitals, pharmaceutical representatives may no
longer purchase lunch for meetings, pay for physicians to attend meetings,
offer dinners, or provide a variety of other items they used to parcel out
such as pens, pads, and occasionally more substantial items such as
stethoscopes. Such gratuities were shown to regularly influence prescribing
behaviors. But, the regulating of small amounts of money on the research
side is far more difficult because such funds are not presented as gifts but
are classified as consulting fees, speaker fees, or reimbursement for
expenses incurred in recruiting subjects.
Institutional conflict of interest committees and IRBs seldom try to
prohibit such income because they may be accused of prohibiting payment
for services. Thus, these committees often discharge their responsibility to
protect the human participants of research by requiring that the physician
disclose to the patient in the consent form that he or she has a relationship
with the sponsoring company. But, of what use can such a disclosure
possibly be? Standards regarding the relationships of clinician-researchers
to sponsoring companies cannot be improved by introducing a "buyer
beware" approach. Patients considering enrolling in research are not
usually positioned to determine whether the physician recruiting them or
the principal investigator named in the consent form is compromised by
their consulting relationships. Requiring disclosure may help all involved
to feel more ethical but it is unlikely to make anyone so.
II. PROMOTING PROFESSIONALISM

Relationships between clinicians who participate in research and the
sponsoring companies need to be of the caliber that inspire rather than
undermine confidence in the research enterprise. While taking consulting
fees in relatively small amounts can be seen as making something of
Subjects Research, Protecting Patients, Preserving Integrity, Advancing Health:
Accelerating the Implementation of COI Policies in Human Subjects Research (Feb. 2008),
available at https://services.aamc.org/publications/showfile.cfn?file=versionl07.pdf&
prdid=220&prv id=268&pdf id=107.
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nothing, such exchanges can threaten the integrity of doctor-patient and
investigator-patient relationships. Physicians who lack appropriate expertise
may become involved in the recruitment of participants to sponsored
studies, their prescribing or device utilization patterns may become biased,
and patients could find themselves recruited to studies which seem to be a
poor fit.
To return to our opening image, what would we like our imaginary
committee to do? It is not obvious how regulatory apparati can restore a
sense of integrity and professionalism to a profession. Almost by
definition, a profession should be self-regulating and set its own standards.
In this case, it seems that the professions must work to overcome a sense of
entitlement that seems to underlay this problem. Too often, professionals
come to see various "perks" as simply something that should come their
way but which they simultaneously see as beneath their notice and unable
to influence them.
Perhaps the future will require that professionals come to see their time
as entirely devoted to their profession and only to be compensated through
their home institutions. This would not prohibit these professionals from
consulting with private industry, but any compensation would be payable to
their home institution, whose time the company is seen to be taking. Of
course, this will require increased diligence to safeguard institutional
integrity, but that is beyond our present scope.
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